Copyright 2003
The Student Life
 
 

U.S. Aid Vital to Columbia's Growth
By Mario Velez
Contributing Writer

We must be wary of the tendency towards a simplistic, one-sided analysis when examining foreign aid to Colombia. True, Colombia has the highest proportion of murders and kidnappings in the general population of any country. True, Colombia is the world’s leading cocaine producer and exporter. And true, it is hard to effectively run Latin America’s oldest democracy while the nation undergoes a 39-year-long civil war that has claimed over 200,000 lives.

However, it would be naive to say that the $2.5 billion the U.S. has spent on Colombia since 2000 to help the government combat drugs and rebels has done nothing to ameliorate the situation of this failing state. Homicides and kidnappings have dropped 16 percent and 22 percent respectively, and according to a U.N. survey, coca cultivation was cut by 30 percent last year alone. While one cannot claim that all these improvements are a direct result of American aid, it is indisputable that U.S. aid has contributed to them. But more importantly, U.S. aid is providing a foundation for the feeling of hope many Colombians currently have of finally putting an end to decades of senseless violence.

If this is not enough to prove that U.S. commitment to Colombia should remain strong, one can also analyze why stability in Colombia is crucial to U.S. interests. Colombia is the United States’ fifth largest trading partner in Latin America and the United States’ ninth largest supplier of petroleum. In addition, a destabilized Colombia would disrupt order in a region whose trade with the U.S. is expected to match that of the European Union by 2010. In the present war on terror, of utmost importance is the fact that the primary security threat in Latin America arises from the three major illegal armed groups in Colombia: the FARC, the AUC, and the ELN—all on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.

September 11 proved that the greatest threats to American security are failing states, not rising ones. Without U.S. aid, Colombia could easily fall into the former category, a path counterproductive to U.S foreign policy. While there need to be improvements to verify that aid is being used to accomplish its intended goals in the appropriate manner, a withdrawal of U.S. aid to Colombia (as was ingenuously suggested in a previous opinions article) is not the answer. As we prepare to enter the real world, this mentality of instant dividends needs to be dropped as it is not applicable to international relations or even practical for everyday life. The War on Terror, rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, and aid to Colombia are all heavy investments that will take years of serious commitment before they can bring concrete results.