Uncovered: What Scott Ritter Didn't Tell You
By James Soloman
Staff Writer

"Iraq's efforts to conceal their (weapons production) capabilities, I believe, have been to disassemble weapons into various components and to hide these components throughout Iraq. I think the danger right now is that without effective inspections, without effective monitoring, Iraq can in a very short period of time, measure the months, reconstitute chemical and biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponization." --Scott Ritter, April 4.

This assessment of Iraq's capabilities directly contradicts the speech given a week ago by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. Ritter forcefully stated that 100% of Iraq's nuclear weapons program was destroyed and that Iraq no longer retained the ability to produce and weaponize chemical and biological agents. So, who gave the preceding quote? Was it Ken Pollack, the notorious author of the "book of lies," or Colin Powell at the UN, or former chief inspector Richard Butler? In fact the surprising answer is Scott Ritter himself, in 1998 on the television show The News Hour.

At a 1998 House hearing Ritter stated that he "received sensitive information of some credibility which indicted that Iraq had the components to assemble three implosion-type devices minus the fissile material and that if Iraq were to obtain fissile material of the quality and of the proper physical properties conducive to such a weapon, then they could assemble three nuclear devices in a very short period of time." At a Senate hearing he also stated that Iraq "remains an ugly threat to its neighbors and to world peace."

Ritter has yet to convincingly explain his reversal. His only explanation is that Iraq could have reconstituted its programs but there is no evidence that they did. This assertion seems questionable given that since he made his original comments he has been without access to intelligence information.

It also fails to recognize how hard it is for outsiders to know the extent of Iraq's programs. For example, the United States government believed they had destroyed most of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs during the Gulf War, only to realize afterward how much of it remained. It also fails to elucidate his reversal with regard to Iraq's ability to make nuclear weapons, were they to obtain fissile material.

The fact that Ritter has contradicted himself does not discount what he has to say. It is possible he was wrong in 1998 and correct today. It does not change his unique first-hand knowledge of the inspections process. It does, however, draw people to take his information with a grain of salt, and it does not allow us to hold him up as proof of the administration's intentional duplicity.

In the end this debate is moot. Once the war ends, the extent of Iraq's programs will be empirically verifiable. Yet for those who attended Mr. Ritter's speech, it is important to know the all the information.