It must take a tremendous amount of discipline on the part
of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher to speak so fluidly while avoiding
every pertinent fact. The only reason I was at his lecture
was that I had gotten a flat tire and had to wait for a ride
home. I only wish that I had taken notes so that I could give
a truly thorough criticism of his presentation.
He discredited himself as soon as he mentioned the Cold War.
Aside from being an Admiral and having a clear vested interest
in not speaking honestly about that period in U.S. history,
it was completely unrelated to his explanation of our current
role in the Pacific Basin. But worse than that, he omitted
the issue of U.S. military “low-intensity conflict”
during the Cold War, which resulted in millions of civilian
deaths throughout Indochina. Speaking on that aggression,
rather than sticking to a discussion of our benevolence, might
have shed some light on the matter. He remarked that it was
a good thing the Cold War never became a “hot” war,
but I’m sure a significant number of people in the region
would differ with his view on that.
He described China’s fast-growing economy, explaining
that it’s very possible China will reach the economic
level of the U.S. in a couple of decades. He didn’t comment
at all on how strategists in Washington view this as an eminent
security threat and have been exploring ways in which they
could subtly undermine China’s progress since before
September 11th. He made no mention of the concerns in Washington
about the steadily increasing trade between China and the
countries of Japan, Korea, India, Russia, and Indonesia, and
how this threatens to undermine U.S. economic leverage in
the region.
He didn’t comment on how Indonesia and the Philippines
are both focal points in the U.S. war on terror, and how they
also just happen to be countries that are rich in gas and
oil. Surely the former Ambassador reads the reports by the
Council on Foreign Relations. Here is an excerpt from one
of that Council’s reports:
“Of special note are oil and gas reserves and production
levels in Indonesia and Brunei. Indonesia, the only Asian
member of OPEC, accounts for 20 percent of the world’s
liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and its reserves are
still not fully known. New oil and gas fields are being discovered
there, in Malaysia, in Vietnam and the Philippines.”
Admiral Prueher was apparently unfamiliar with former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Katherine Kelle’s rather candid
statement in 1997: “The U.S. interest in Central Asia
has much to do with the vast oil and natural gas fields that,
by 2010, will make the region the world’s third largest
producer of petroleum products.”
He did somewhat allude to the fact that we have energy concerns
in the region, but he stated that our goal was the pursuit
of mutual prosperity. Again, I have to wonder if he ever met
any of China’s government or business leaders while he
was there. Had he done so, I’m sure he would have discovered
that over 40 percent of Chinese exports to the United States
are internal corporate transfers within US businesses, meaning
the export figures are actually the result of U.S. companies
in China sending their finished products back to the United
States. He also missed out on the fact that the U.S. literally
owns almost half of China’s industrial economy. It would
seem that China’s only real opportunity for power in
the U.S.-dominated global economy would be through control
of nonrenewable energy sources. But, as anyone who cares to
look can see, the U.S. is already on top of that as well.
How could U.S.-China relations be discussed seriously without
a mention of China’s aspirations for a Pan Asian Global
Energy Bridge? The proposed cooperative venture between China
and the rest of Asia and the Middle East was on the table
in 2000 and 2001. The proposal consisted of building a pipeline
through the Middle East, the Caspian Basin, Russia, China,
and even across the sea to Japan. Such a project would significantly
diminish the United States coercive influence via Naval blockades.
Could Navy Admiral Prueher not have been briefed on this?
Other things cast a shadow on Admiral Prueher’s credibility—such
as his statement that Suharto, the U.S.-supported Indonesian
dictator responsible for the brutal killing of one-third of
the entire population of East Timor, was a stabilizing presence
in the area. Or his assertion, after the Suharto comment,
that one of the goals of the United States in the region was
to promote democracy. But his position, all of his points,
and even his omissions were completely predictable.
The biggest disappointment for me was how the Pomona students
who were present responded to the Admiral’s lecture.
Not one of them seemed at all critical of what he had to say.
The venue was filled, instead, with eager drones nodding in
agreement. It seemed to me that most of the students present
were just happy they knew anything at all about what the Admiral
was discussing, and were too busy, patting themselves on the
back for their ability even marginally to comprehend the issues
he addressed, to evaluate the implications of his statements.
The questions they asked were superficial and obvious, as
the students put more effort into wording their questions
intelligently than they did into evaluating the lecture’s
substance, an evaluation which might have prompted meaningful
inquiry.
