Former U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of
China and former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command
Joseph W. Prueher made an unusual appearance this past Tuesday
at the Rose Hills Theatre to give a lecture addressing issues
of contemporary U.S. foreign policy and the American role
in East Asia.
One of the most senior government figures to appear at the
college in quite some time, Prueher attracted an unusually
large crowd for an academic lecture, including many professors
of politics and international relations. The lecture was sponsored
by the Pacific Basin Institute, and institute chairman and
professor of politics Frank Gibney introduced the speaker.
Prueher was dressed in civilian attire, although his military
background showed through in his terse, straightforward speaking
style, and in his fondness for sports and combat analogies.
He warned the audience that his views were derived not from
extensive scholarly study of Asia but merely from his professional
experience as a soldier and diplomat.
Surprisingly, the crisis over a downed U.S. spy plane in China
in 2000, the single most remarkable event in U.S.-China relations
during Prueher’s tenure as ambassador, was mentioned
only in passing.
He put forward a vision of U.S. foreign policy primarily concerned
with the issue of stability, which he argued was in the best
interests both of China and the United States. He argued that
many military conflicts result from issues of ‘haves’
and ‘have nots,’ and that China, contrary to popular
belief, has become a ‘have’ nation. He thus downplayed
the idea that war with China was inevitable, and criticized
the opposition of conflict and cooperation as the only possibilities
for dealing with China as too simplistic.
He felt, however, that trouble in East Asia might emerge from
any of three “flash-points”—Kashmir, the Korean
peninsula or the Taiwan straits.
Progress on the first of these issues, according to Prueher,
has come now that U.S. relations with Pakistan have improved.
No longer do the U.S. and China approach this issue from opposite
sides of the fence, but rather both seek to prevent India
and Pakistan from going to war.
On the second issue, Prueher said that both China and the
U.S. had a common interest in a stable, nonnuclear Korean
peninsula. He acknowledged that the large U.S. military presence
in South Korea and Japan was not necessarily popular with
all countries in the region but argued that since Asia as
a whole is unwilling to accept a strong, rearmed Japan as
a guarantor of security, the American presence was indispensable.
On the Taiwan issue he reaffirmed the U.S. government’s
“one China” policy, and suggested that the best
course of action on the Taiwan issue was “trying to leave
it alone.” He also hinted that behind the strong pro-Taiwan
campaign rhetoric of the Bush administration, they would probably
deal with the Taiwan issue in a pragmatic fashion.
Following his speech the admiral fielded a wide range of questions,
from the banal to the bizarre. “I think our governments
basically don’t trust each other,” he said in response
to a question on the subject of mutual perceptions, and attributed
China’s mistrust to its historical subjugation at the
hands of colonial powers.
When asked about the prospects for democratization in China,
he cautioned against excessive optimism. “It’s a
little ways off,” he said. “We need to be resolute
in supporting our values without being sanctimonious or hypocritical.”
A question about the U.S. government’s refusal to build
a canal through southern Mexico as an alternative to the Panama
Canal seemed to catch the admiral off-guard, and he pleaded
ignorance of the subject.
Jacqueline Wong-Hernandez contributed to this report. ]
